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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Case N o .
'-. PI a:i n t I ff-Respondnnt,

14 58 5

~vsHARRY MAESTAS,

:

Defendant-Appel ] ant.
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from the Third Distiicr
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by a [prisoner, a felony of the third degree
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
''• Appellant w a s tried on a two count i nformation'

alleging that he committed the crimes of aggravated sexual
a -0,-^1.

fc

....

;SC;^,M1 I.

v-v a prisoner.

Appellant w a s convicted

]u,) oi assault, ;\>v a prisoner and was acquitted of

aggravated sexual assault.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks that the jury verdict,
and sentence imposed pursuant thereto, be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the trial, Michael William Hart, convicted
of first degree arson and second degree murder, testified
that on January 15, 1976, he was a prisoner at the Utah
State Prison, incarcerated in "Cff section of the maximum
security facility.

He further testified as follows: Upon

leaving his job in the prison kitchen around 5:00 p.m.
on January 15, 197 6, he returned to his cell, stopping
off at the lieutenant's office to pick up come commissary
order forms (T. 14). Upon reaching his cell area, he
proceeded to his individual cell, walked back out and gave
some commissary forms to the defendant Harry Maestas, who
was sitting on a table watching T.V. with another cellmate,
Edward Cornish.

He then proceeded to give some of the

slips to Cornish, place some on another cellmate's bed
(Myron Lance), then return to his cell and place the
remainder on his desk. (T. 17). Hart then walked out of
his cell, heading towards the table the T.V. was on,
looking for a bucket to use for washing (T. 17). As
Hart turned around to ask Maestas or Cornish if either
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knew where the bucket was, he (Hart) was hit by Maestas*
Hart was then pushed into his cell by Maestas and Cornish,
where they struck him several more times, telling Hart
that they were tired of being harassed by him about the
commissary (T. 18-19).

Conversation then occurred

between Hart and Maestas (T. 19-20).

Hart was then beaten

again by Maestas (T. 20).
Other medical testimony confirmed that Hart
had received lacerations and bruises (T. 92,99).
Testimony by Sergeant Ken Miles of the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office revealed a statement made
to him by the appellant Maestas to the effect that he
(Maestas) "nailed" Hart because Hart was "driving"
on him about money ow^d to Hart by Maestas (T. 126-128).
Appellant Maestas admits striking Hart four or
five times because he claimed he heard Cornish yell "Watch
out", and because Hart allegedly "came on" Maestas real
fast (T. 218-219).

On cross-examination, Maestas

admitted hitting Hart because he (Hart) was "driving"
on Maestas about the commissary (T. 244).
Cornish's testimony followed pretty much the
same outline as that of Maestas, although

Cornish claims

he did not see the blows themselves, only the results
therefrom (T. 195).
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It seems apparent that the jury believed that
portion of Hart's testimony relating the incident, at
least beyond a reasonable doubt, since a guilty verdict
of assault by a prisoner was returned (T. 321).
Appellant Maestas, who testified in this case,
has been convicted of second degree murder, manslaughter,
armed robbery and burglary (T. 214).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE
COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS HART CONCERNING
AGREEMENTS WITH THE STATE IN RETURN FOR HIS TESTIMONY
DID NOT DENY APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Appellant contends that the trial judge refused
to allow defense counsel to bring out the nature of the
State's agreement with the victim (William Hart) in return
for his testimony, and this refusal was prejudicial to
appellant.

A thorough reading of the transcript reveals

no evidence whatsoever of any agreement between Hart and
the State of Utah regarding favors for Hart in return for
his testimony.

Thus it would seem that appellant is being

rather presumptuous in assuming that any agreement
existed, when in fact there is no evidence to indicate
any agreement whatsoever.
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Appellant cites several cases which reinforce
the axiomatic principle that cross-examination of
witnesses is fundamental to preserve the constitutional
right of confrontation of witnesses.

Respondent does

not take issue with appellant as to this constitutionally
protected right, nor is issue taken in regards to the
use of cross examination to expose possible motives of
a witness for testifying.

This was expressed by the

Utah Supreme Court in State v. Smelser, 23 Utah 2d 347
463 P.2d 562 (1970) where the court quoted from respondent's
brief in a footnote:
"Cross examination is a matter
of right. . . it . . . may be designed
to expose the motives of the witness
for testifying as he did on direct
examination; and that such exposure
properly goes to the credibility of
. . . [his] . . . direct testimony.
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624
(1931)."
It seems, however, that appellant has not
grasped the concept that cross-examination is not a
"fishing expedition", nor is it unlimited, lying at the
whimsical disposal of either defense counsel or the
prosecutor, to be used when and in whatever manner either
may see fit.

The extent of cross-examination is a matter

which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge,
State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972),
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and this exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be
interfered with by the Supreme Court unless there is an
abuse of discretion to

the prejudice of the defendant.

State v, Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972);
State v. Robinson, 24 Wash. 2d 909, 167 P.2d 986 (1946).
Cross examination on motives or bias of witnesses
may be curtailed, without necessarily being prejudicial.
People v. Currey, 97 Cal. App.2d 537, 218 P.2d 153
(1950) . American Jurisprudence gives an excellent summary
as to when and for what reasons cross examination as to
motives for testifying may be restricted in 81 Am. Jur.
2d § 560, pp. 561, 563-564:
"In criminal cases, it is widely
recognized that counsel for the accused
has the right to cross-examine witnesses
for the prosecution for the purpose of
showing their motives in testifying
and that considerable latitude in such
respect should be allowed.
On the other hand, it lies
within the sound discretion of the
trial court to determine the propriety
of such cross-examination, and abuse
of that discretion must be shown in
order to constitute prejudicial error.
The denial or restriction of crossexamination as to the motive of a
witness for the prosecution has been
held proper, or at least not prejudically erroneous, when the questions
asked were repetitious; when the crossexamination sought to bring out speculative matter; where the matter sought to
be elicited had been brought out in
evidence previously or subsequently
adduced.,f
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In the case at hand, review of the transcript
(T. 60-61) reveals that the questions asked by appellant's
counsel on cross-examination of William Hart as to whether
or not he had negotiated with the State in return for
his testimony were repetitious, speculative, and had
already been answered on cross-examination by Hart.
When being questioned by appellant's counsel on crossexamination , the following colloquy between Hart and
Mr. Keller (appellant's counsel) took place:
"Mr. Keller: Isn't it true that you
made up this story so you could get
out of the maximum security unit of
the Utah State Prison?
Mr. Hart:

No Sir.

Mr. Keller: You have never told anyone
that you wanted to get out of maximum
security unit?
Mr. Hart:
get out.

Sir, I have said I wanted to

Mr. Keller:
you could?
Mr. Hart:

And you would do it any way

No Sir. (T. 33)."

Further cross-examination of Hart by appellant's
counsel resulted in the following colloquy:
Mr. Keller: I see, you testified at the
preliminary hearing in this matter that
you knew, well before this incident
on January 15th that you had better get
out of maximum security didn't you?
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Mr. Hart:

No Sir,

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

You didn't?

No Sir.

Mr. Keller: But you were concerned about
staying in maximum security at Utah State
Prison?
Mr. Hart:

No Sir, I was not.

Mr. Keller: Because of other incidents
you were involved in?
Mr. Hart:

No Sir.

Mr. Keller: In fact you wanted out of
there Mr. Hart?
Mr. Hart:
yes.

I would have liked to got out,

Mr. Keller: Yes? You are not afraid to
admit that you wanted out of maximum
security?
Mr. Hart:

Yes Sir. (T. 59)."

Sergeant Ken Miles of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Office was cross-examined by appellant's counsel
in regards to an interview that Sergeant Miles had with
the victim Michael Hart.

The following colloquy ensued:

"Mr. Keller: . . . . Well, after Mr.
Hart talked with you did you indicate
to him that you would take any steps
to see that there were no repercussions
from him making these allegations?
Sergeant Miles: I told him that the
only choice I had was to present the
case to the county attorney and in the
event there is a criminal complaint issued
then it is between the sheriff and the
warden of the prison to make arrangements
for his care.
-8-

Mr. Keller: He did demand of you
certain conditions before he made
a statement didn't he? Did he
detective Miles?
Sergeant Miles:

I would say no.

Mr. Keller: Didn't he tell you he
wanted out of the Utah State Prison,
he wanted to be transferred to another prison?
Sergeant Miles:

No. (T. 140-141)."

Appellant alleges in his brief that there
apparently was an agreement between the State and Mr. Hart
that if Mr. Hart testified for the State, he would not
be sent back to Utah State Prison, but would remain
incarcerated in one of the local jails.

The above colloquies

most definitely negate the allegations of appellant as
to the existence of any such agreement.

Appellant's

counsel, however, not receiving the answer he was seeking,
continued to "fish" for answers which would substantiate
his allegations and further his client's cause.

The

following colloquy is the subject of this particular
point of the appeal:
"Mr. Keller: And as a result of your
testimony in this case the State has
agreed to not send you back to the
Utah State Prison, haven't they?
Mr. Stott:
Court:

Sustained.

Mr. Keller:
Court:

I'm going to object.

Your Honor.

Objection is sustained.
-9-

Mr. Keller: I would like to argue
that point, Your Honor, may we do so
outside the presence of the jury?
Court:

Ask your next question.

Mr. Keller: May we at least approach
the bench on it?
Court: Ask your next question counsel,
please.
Mr. Keller: What other agreement did
you make with the State of Utah for
your testimony, Mr. - - Mr. Stott: I'm going to object to
that, there isn't any evidence, he is
assuming things.
Court:

Objection is sustained.

Mr. Keller: Your Honor, we are
entitled to know what agreements have
been made with this man in return for
his testimony against the defendants.
There is a long line of case law that
allows us to do that.
Court: Ask your next question counsel.
(T. 60-61)."
Certainly the objection to Mr. Keller's
question was sustained on the grounds of repetition.
Mr. Hart had already answered this question in the
negative.

Perhaps counsel for appellant continued to

ask this question due to his disbelief of Mr. Hart's
answer.

If so, the trial judge was correct in restricting
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further cross-examination.

In People v. Clay, 27 111. 2d

87 187 N.E.2d 719 (1963), a witness for the prosecution
stated she had not been paid to act as an informer,
whereupon defense counsel stated "In other words, you
do it for the good of the country, is that correct?"
The objection to the question was sustained.

The court

said:
"The question appears to be rehetorical
and shows counsel's disbelief in the
witnesses previous answer that she was
not paid to be an informant."
Sustaining of the objection was held not to be restricting
of cross-examination*
A similar situation existed in People v. Bliss,
76 111. 2d 232, 222 N.E.2d 57 (1966).

There a witness

for the prosecution had disclosed that a charge against
her for possession of narcotics had been dropped.

Defense

counsel continued on cross-examination to further inquire
as to promises by police to dismiss such charges.

The

court sustained objections to further questions on crossexamination as being repetitious and superfluous.

This

was held not to be improper limiting of cross-examination.
There is a long line of cases upholding the
aforementioned principle that limiting of cross-examination
where the questions are repetitious will be sustained and
will not be held to prejudice the defendant.
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State v.

White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965); People v.
Micelo, 101 Cal. App. 2d 643, 226 P.2d 14 (1951); People
v. Warren, 175 Cal. App. 2d 233, 346 P.2d 64 (1959).
Since there is no evidence that any agreement
exists between Hart and the State, appellant's allegation
is speculative at best.

In State v. Knapp, 14 Wash. App.

101, 540 P.2d 898 (1975), the court held that it is not
error for the trial court to limit or reject crossexamination where the circumstances only remotely tend
to show bias or prejudice of the witness, where the
evidence is vague, or where the evidence is merely
argumentative and speculative.
It should be pointed out that the nature of the
question asked by Mr. Keller carried with it an implication
that perhaps an agreement did exist between Hart and the
State, and the jury would certainly have been aware of
defense counsel's objections in asking the question.
Such was the case in State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185
S.E.2d 227 (1971).

An objection to a question whether

or not an accomplice's attorney told him he would get
help on his parole in return for his testimony was
sustained.

No abuse of discretion was found.

The

court said there was no showing that the verdict was
influenced, and that the question itself carried full
implication to the jury of any contention suggested.
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Finally, the question should perhaps be asked
"Would the answering of further questions by Mr. Hart
have further aided the jury when he had already given
his answers?"

If not, then restricting or curtailment

of cross-examination is not error.

People v. French,

75 111. 2d 453, 220 N.E.2d 635 (1966).

In the case at

hand, it seems doubtful that allowing Hart to answer
further questions from appellant's counsel on crossexamination would have further aided the jury in determining credibility or weight to be given to Hart's
testimony.
The latest Utah case on the subject of
restricting cross-examination when attempting to
show bias is State v. Smelser, infra.

There the

Supreme Court of Utah held that the trial court's
refusal to permit cross-examination of a prosecution
witness to raise an implication that the witness,
who was in jail with the defendant, was testifying in
order to gain favors such as a quicker release from
jail, may have been error, but if so, was not prejudicial
to the defendant.

It should be noted that the court

in Smelser did not, as appellant says, declare the
trial court committed error in refusing to permit
cross-examination of the witness, but merely declared
that error may have been committed.
not prejudicial.
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Even so, it was

In conclusion, several points should be noted.
First, any possible arrangement between Hart and the State
in return for his testimony was denied by Hart when he
said his motive for testifying was not for the purpose
of gaining release from maximum security or the Utah
State Prison.

Hart was not fabricating a story con-

cerning his beating, since there was corroborating
evidence that Hart had been beaten.

Second, there is

not evidence of any agreement between Hart and the State
other than appellantfs counsel's allegations and speculations.

Third, the jury

was apprised of any implications

or suspicions when Hart answered the "accusing" questions
the first and second times they were asked, and even
the third time when the objection to the question was
sustained.
It would seem that the trial judge's decision
to sustain the objection was based on repetition or
speculation.

No abuse of discretion to the prejudice

of appellant can be found.
should be left to stand.

The trial court's decision

There is no showing that the

jury's verdict would have been or could have been different.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
WITH REGARD TO SELF-DEFENSE DID NOT DENY APPELLANT HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
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Appellant submitted a self-defense instruction
(R. 74 1/2) which was refused by the trial court for
the reason that there was no substantive evidence to
warrant giving of the instruction•

A review of the

evidence contained in the transcript will reveal that
the trial judge was correct in his ruling.
A.

The Evidence.

On cross-examination the victim William Hart
was asked whether or not it was true that the reason
Harry Maestas hit him was because he (Hart) came up
behind Maestas1 back and jabbed his finger into his
back.

Hart answered no, that this was not the reason

(T. 32-33).

Further cross-examination reveals the

sequence of events as described by Hart:
"Mr. Keller: Okay, when you walked
out of your cell with the commissary
slips you walked directly over to where
Mr. Maestas was sitting?
Mr. Hart:

Yes Sir.

Mr. Keller: And at that time you came
up directly behind his back, did you
not?
Mr. Hart:

No, I came to his side.

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

His side?

Yes Sir.

-15-

Mr. Keller: And with your finger you
punched him in the shoulder like that,
didn't you?
Mr. Hart:

No Sir.

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

You didn't?

No Sir.

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

You deny that?

Yes Sir.

Mr. Keller: Okay, it was at that point
that Harry twirled and hit you in the face
right?
Mr. Hart:

No Sir.

Mr. Keller:

What happened then?

Mr. Hart: After I gave the slips to Harry
I walked over and gave some to Cornish and
walked over and placed some on Myron Lance's
bunk and returned to my cell with the
remainder.
Mr. Keller:

And what did you

do?

Mr. Hart: Then I walked out to find the
wash bucket which had been underneath the
table prior to that.
Mr. Keller: I see, did you ask Harry where
that wash bucket was?
Mr. Hart: I was turning to do so at the
time I was struck.
Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

Where was the wash bucket?
I don't know, I didn't see it,

Mr. Keller: You never saw it?
you want the wash bucket for?

What did

Mr. Hart: To wash out an apron that I
wore in the kitchen.
Mr. Keller: To wash out an apron that you
wore? Okay. And it is your testimony then
-16-

that it was at this point when you
were over here in this bench area
that Mr. Maestas hit you?
Mr. Hart: I was over on the left hand
side of the bench.
Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

No in front of him, towards - -

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

In front of him?

Right, in that area, yes sir.

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

And you turned to talk to him?

Yes Sir.

Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

Behind Mr. Maestas?

Your back was to him?

My side, my back.

Mr. Keller: And just for no reason, just
out of the blue he just hauled off and hit
you?
Mr. Hart: Yes.
Mr. Keller:
Mr. Hart:

That is your testimony?

Yes Sir." (T. 40-42).

Other testimony by Hart disclosed that he had no idea
why Maestas hit him (T. 44), nor did he recall Maestas
making a statement to the effect "Look, don't come up
on my back like that.

I'm sorry I hit you."

(T. 56).

A very important piece of evidence is the testimony
that Maestas owed Hart money (T. 37).
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Testimony by third parties refute any theory
of self defense.

Dr. Austin testified that he observed

abrasions, several bruises, and lacerations on Hart,
which would very strongly indicate that several punches
were thrown on Hart (T. 99), as would the swollen hands
of Maestas. (T. 108) .
Sergeant William Johnstun testified that Harry
Maestas told him that he had hit Hart because Hart had
made some smart remark to him, and he (Maestas) had lost
his temper and hit him. (T. 109).
Sergeant Ken Miles took a statement from
Harry Maestas, and related the contents of that statement
during the trial.

During the statement Maestas told

Sergeant Miles that he (Maestas) had hit Hart because
Hart "was driving on him" about money owed to Hart by
Maestas (T. 126-128).

Maestas never made any mention to

Sergeant Miles about Hart poking him (Maestas) with his
finger before being struck.

Maestas also admitted that

he owed Hart money, and that he had struck Hart four or
fives more times after the initial blow (T. 127).
Testimony by appellant's witnesses did not
aid his theory of self-defense.

Edward Cornish testified

that he did not see Maestas hit Hart (T. 205), when just
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prior to that statement he testified he saw Hart get
hit by Harry (T. 204-205).

At best, we have appellant's

witness contradicting himself.

Appellantfs other witness,

Myron Lance, testified that he really didn't know
what went on or what occurred (T. 191).
Finally, we have appellant's testimony.

We

have already seen where appellant has told Sergeant
Johnstun that he hit Hart because he (Maestas) had lost
his temper over a smart remark allegedly made by Hart,
while telling Sergeant Miles that he (Maestas) nailed
Hart because he (Hart) was driving on him about some
money owed to Hart by Maestas. It should be noted that
this subject of money had been discussed by Maestas
and Cornish prior to Maestas beating up Hart (T. 127-128).
Appellant also testified that he hit Hart because he
(Hart) had sneaked up to him (T. 220), and yet he tries
to justify why he told Sergeant Johnstun and Sergeant
Miles a different reason for the beating while being
cross-examined (T. 228).
At best, what we have is a defendant with
multiple felony convictions giving different people
different versions and reasons as to why he beat up
Hart.

One reason is because Maestas owed Hart money.

-19-

Another is because Hart made a smart remark and Maestas
lost his temper.

Another

is because Hart allegedly

"poked" his finger on Maestas1 chest, while yet another is
because Hart "slapped" Maestas* arm with some commissary
slips.

Finally, we have Maestas saying that he had no

reason to believe that Hart was going to hurt him,
other than Maestas1 belief that Hart was coming up on
him too fast (T. 236). Maestas1 reply to the question
as to why he kept hitting Hart time after time when he
could have stopped after the first couple of hits and
asked why he (Hart) came up on him so fast was that he
(Maestas) wanted to make sure he (Hart) couldn't hurt
him (T. 236)There was no evidence of self-defense for
the jury to consider.

What we have is an attempt

by appellant's counsel to "inject" words into the
witnesses1 mouths which would give credence to his
theory of "self-defense".
B.

The Law.

Certainly the defendant in any criminal case
is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted
to the jury by appropriate instructions iif such a theory
is supported by competent and substantial evidence.
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This has been the law in Utah for many years and remains
so at the present time, having been reaffirmed by the
Utah Supreme Court many times.

State v. Newton, 105 Utah

561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943); State v. Johnson, 112 Utah
130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d
70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969); State v. Gillam, 23 Utah 2d 372,
463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145,
The question then to be answered is whether
or not there exists in the case at hand substantial
evidence with which to support appellant's claim of
self-defense.

A look at the Castillo case answers

that question in the negative.

In Castillo, the

defendant barged into his former wife's house
armed with a knife, anticipating trouble.

His sole basis

for apprehension was his observation of a stick under
the couch on a previous occasion.

There was there,

as here, several versions of what happened.

The

prosecution's version claimed that defendant was
met at the door by his ex-wife's brother, who defendant
claimed had a stick.

Defendant's ex-wife was then summoned

by her brother to hurry and phone a cab, at which time
defendant came at the brother with a knife.
wife interceded and grabbed the knife.

The ex-

Defendant then

wrenched the knife away and stabbed her.

She ran, and

as she left she observed the defendant advancing towards
-21-

her brother with the knife.

She heard the sound of

a stick breaking, then a struggle between her brother
and the defendant ensued
stabbed.

with her brother being

The defendant's version claimed that the

brother hit him (defendant) from behind with a stick,
knocking the defendant to the floor.

The defendant

then came at the brother with a knife.

There is then

no further recollection of what happened by the
defendant.
In refusing defendant's request for a selfdefense instruction, holding that there was not substantial evidence to support such a theory, the court
said:
"In State v. Johnson, the court
observed that in those cases where
a request for instructions on
defendant's theory was sustained,
defendant's evidence established
a state of facts which, if believed
by the jury, established adequate
provocation, lawful acts on the part
of the defendant, or ether aggravating
facts.
If the defendant's evidence, although
in material conflict with the State's
prooff be such that the jury may
entertain a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not he acted in selfdefense, he is entitled to have the
jury instructed fully and clearly
on the law of self-defense. Conversely,
if all reasonable men must conclude that
the evidence is so slight as to be
incapable of raising at reasonable doubt
in the jury's mind as to whether a
defendant accused of a crime acted in
-22-

self-defense, tendered instructions
thereon are properly refused."
No evidence in the case at hand can be found which
would raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as
to whether or not Maestas acted

in self-defense.

In

fact, no evidence can be found to indicate that any
unlawful force, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-4 02,
(1953), as amended, was used against Maestas at all.
Did Maestas reasonably believe that unlawful force
was about to be used against him?

Certainly the

evidence does not indicate so.
As was so well put by the court in Castillo,
in quoting from State v. Talavico, 57 Utah 229, 234,
193 P. 860, 861 (1920), what we have in the case at
hand is the following situation:
"While the theory of counsel,
persistently and strenuously urged,
was that of self-defense, it was
nevertheless all theory and no
evidence, all shadow and no substance. "
We have at the very worst, if defendant's
final version is believed, a case of Kart touching
Maestas on the arm with commissary slips, subsequently
being stricken severely four of five times for "coming
up on him (Maestas) too fast."

What we really have,

however, is a case of Maestas owing Hart some money,
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Hart asking when he can expect payment, and Hart subsequently being severely beaten up for no apparent reason
other than he was "driving on" Maestas and his nerves.
This is admitted by appellant himself in one of his
versions of his ever-changing story.
It is clear that the trial judge could not see
any evidence, substantive or not, of unlawful force which
was used against the appellant.

An instruction on self-

defense would therefore have been improper.

This the

trial judge decided as a matter of law, and rightly so.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore mentioned, respondent
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the conviction
and subsequent sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
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